May 31, 2007 3:54
Lebanon Gets a Hariri Tribunal
Despite the new crisis involving the radical Islamist Fatah al-Islam group, the March 14 coalition, Lebanon's multi-confessional, pro-independence and pro-democracy grouping, is surprisingly confident. Checking in with various contacts in the coalition this week, I found two reasons for this. As bad as the clashes in Tripoli have been, Prime Minister Fouad Siniora's government believes that it has pre-empted Fatah al-Islam's plans to wreak much greater havoc sometime down the road. The government also believes that it has collected solid evidence of Syria's secret backing for Fatah al-Islam, which it feels will further undermine the Syrian regime in Lebanon, the region and the world.
That leads me to the other reason for the confidence: the U.N. Security Council's vote on Wednesday to set up an international tribunal to try the perpetrators of numerous recent assassinations in Lebanon, notably that of former Prime Minister Rafic Hariri. March 14 leaders see the tribunal not only as a means of seeking justice for the victims, but as an instrument with which to punish the Syrian regime and terminate its ability to manipulate events in Lebanon. Syria's allies in the parliament had blocked Siniora's efforts to establish the tribunal in Lebanon, so the Security Council, at the government's request, has moved to set it up as an international body. This is indeed a major breakthrough for the March 14 coalition; a U.N. investigation into the killing of Hariri has already implicated two close relatives of President Bashar Assad in the 2005 plot. March 14 leaders assert that the Fatah al-Islam group was sent to Lebanon by the Syrian regime to sow chaos as a way of derailing the tribunal. The tribunal may represent the first instance in which an Arab dictatorship is held accountable for its crimes before international justice.
A few hours before the 10-0-5 vote on U.N. Resolution 1757 in New York, I passed by the village of Bikfaya high in Lebanon's mountains for a chat with former Lebanese President Amin Gemayel, whose son Pierre's assassination last year is among the crimes that will be brought before the tribunal. Gemayel's brother Bashir was also assassinated, back in 1982, in a bombing widely blamed on the Syrian regime. Gemayel lost another relative in a bus bombing three months ago along the road I drove up to Bikfaya that the government has blamed on Fatah al-Islam.
As we sat in a salon filled with Oriental carpets, antique swords and modern Lebanese art, birds chirping outside the open windows, Gemayel was clearly relieved and pleased about the tribunal. But his manner was gracious rather than vengeful. Although March 14 personalities generally blame Syria for all the killings, Gemayel once again preferred not to point fingers, saying he would await and respect the findings of the U.N. investigation and the verdict of the tribunal. But he obviously saw the tribunal as a breakthrough in Lebanon's struggle for independence from its neighbor.
When I asked him about concerns that the creation of the tribunal will itself spark further tensions and violence, which Syrian officials have indeed predicted, Gemayel replied, "The situation was not so calm, was not so pleasant, was not so comfortable until now. What's going on in the camps in Tripoli, the bombs in Verdun, in Achrifieh and in Aley, the assassination of several leaders, the bombs in the Ain Alaq area: the chaos was prevailing here."
Now with the tribunal, he went on, "Maybe they will try to make more bombs and assassinations, but this time, in my opinion, it is the end of this process. We have to expect a change in behavior of those parties. Maybe it can inaugurate a new era of justice. For the first time, the criminals are under international scrutiny, for the first time in the Arab world. It's a message to other criminals elsewhere. The fact that those criminals can imagine they will be discovered and taken to justice is a deterrent by itself.
Gemayel told me he felt that the tribunal could help launch a new era of peace in Lebanon as well.
"I want to tell you something," he said. "The tribunal will not revive my son. I know very well that I lost him forever. I lost a part of myself. But in fact what is essential for me is to avoid more tears, more blood. That's important for us to inaugurate an era of serenity and security for our children. The Lebanese society paid a very high price. That's why for us the tribunal is not a question of revenge, or a victory for us, but a way to stop the tears and blood and build a better future. We are looking for the future, not the past. The past is over for me. When I look around me, it is horrible, the number of widows, mothers still wearing black, like my wife, my daughter and my daughter-in-law."
--By Scott MacLeod/Bikfaya
May 29, 2007 8:10
Israeli Labor Leader Ousted
It was a fitting end to the career of Amir Peretz, the Israeli Labor leader and much reviled Defense Minister. Peretz fell into disgrace for his mishandling of last summer’s Lebanon war and was challenged for the leadership post inside his party. As Peretz went to cast a vote for himself in party elections on Monday at his hometown of Sderot, near the Palestinian enclave of Gaza, a dozen missiles from Palestinian militants thudded down.
Nobody was hurt, but it was an embarrassing reminder to Labor party members that Peretz –-one of the rare defense ministers in recent years who wasn’t a general—couldn’t defend his own town let alone the Israeli nation. During Tuesday’s tally, Peretz polled a distant third, behind front-runner and former Prime Minister Ehud Barak (35.6%) and a former domestic intelligence chief Ami Ayalon (30.6). To win, a candidate needs 40% of the vote, so rivals Barak and Ayalon will face off in the second round, on June 12th.
Peretz’s political career flat-lined after he was photographed looking at a military display with binoculars whose lense caps were still on.The ridicule never died down among Israelis. This is why we didn’t win the war against Hizballah, Israelis exclaimed, as Peretz’s popularity fell into the arctic, sub-zero range and was deemed irretrevable. After the Lebanon fracas, the rating of Prime Minister Ehud Olmert wasn’t much better, at only three percent. Peretz has one small consolation: Barak and Ayalon, even after the rude things they said about him, must now try to court his backing for election victory.
by Tim McGirk/Jerusalem
May 29, 2007 7:16
And the Winner Is...
Just got back to Beirut after a quick, depressing trip to Damascus. Before I left Syria, the Interior Ministry announced that Bashar Al Assad won Sunday's referendum on whether he should continue as Syria's president by 97.6 percent of the vote.
No surprises here. Bashar "won" by a little less than that in 2000. And the actual number itself is meaningless because -- do I even have to say it? -- the books are completely cooked. I mean, really, if turnout was 95 percent as officials claim, that means the government counted about 20 million paper ballots in around 36 hours.
No, the depressing part about the referendum was the Stalinist-style campaign that preceded it and which will continue through to the inauguration. As I wrote in my post on Sunday, sometimes it feels as if every exposed surface space in central Damascus is covered in portraits of Bashar.
At first, it's funny to see all these cartoonish cameos of the Noble Leader, until you realized that such a display of single-minded authoritarianism is only possible in a country that is suffering from a massive sense of humor failure. This unvarnished idol worshipping exists totally outside of irony.
In the past, I've heard stories about people in Syria being jailed for passing on e-mail jokes about the president. And, it's true that the Assad regime prepared for the referendum by jailing a slew of opposition candidates; and it temporarily shut the offices of a newspaper that published cartoons lampooning the parliamentary elections last month. But it's also very easy to exaggerate the extent of the crackdown against dissidents and would be satirists.
For one thing, the Syrian opposition is a bad joke. There can't be more than 20 key figures among the secular opposition parties, and most of them just whine. The day of the referendum, my friend Andrew Tabler (editor of Syria Today) and I met with a member of the opposition movement known as the Damascus Declaration, who complained about how all the new cars flooding the highways of Syria were cheap imports that would break down in 10 years. ("Surely, that's not Bashar Al Assad's fault," Andrew said.) This is apparently what passes for opposition economic critique.
But the really bad joke is that the Middle East is in such dire straits at the moment that even a second-tier strongman like Bashar looks like a steady pair of hands compared to the chaos surrounding him. Bashar is hardly blameless in these matters: the US accuses him of supporting terrorists in Iraq, Israel and Lebanon. But the United States has given democracy and reform such a bad name in the Middle East that Bashar might even have won a real election. Too bad we'll never know.
--Andrew Lee Butters/Beirut
May 28, 2007 12:03
Inside Today's U.S.-Iran Talks
In Baghdad today, the U.S. and Iranian ambassadors—Ryan Crocker and Hassan Kazemi Qomi--are holding a landmark meeting between the two countries to discuss stability in Iraq. It's the first public bilateral diplomacy between Washington and Tehran in 27 years.
I moderated a panel at the World Economic Forum meeting in Jordan last week that gave a fascinating glimpse into the issues, positions and mindsets that the U.S. and Iran bring to the discussions. The highlight of the WEF panel were several direct and indirect exchanges between Republican U.S. Sen. Orrin Hatch, a member of the Senate Intelligence Committee, and Dr. Mohammed Javad Larijani, a former Iranian MP and influential conservative foreign affairs strategist. Larijani, whose brother Ali is secretary of Iran’s Supreme National Security Council and heads Iran’s nuclear negotiations, kindly spoke in English rather than Farsi.
Parsing the U.S.-Iranian exchanges in Jordan, a few things stand out. There was some predictable talking past one another. Yet Hatch and Larijani seemed to emphasize that both countries are sincere about holding talks, the U.S. because it needs help in Iraq, and Iran because it wants to reduce tensions between the U.S. and Iran. It was Larijani who argued that the talks on Iraq could lead to discussions on other issues, presumably like Iran’s nuclear program. Given the 30-year bipartisan freeze on U.S. relations with Iran, it was interesting to see a statesman of Hatch’s stature declaring there was “no excuse” for not holding discussions with Tehran.
You could discern an Iranian strategic edge in the comments. Larijani flatly described the U.S. as being “bogged down” in Iraq and almost gloated that the U.S. had learned the limits of unilateralism the hard way. Hatch quite humbly and honestly acknowledged American mistakes in Iraq; I counted him using the word stable, or some form of it, 13 times, surely a sign of Washington’s anxieties. Seven times Hatch expressed his “respect” for Iran or admiration for Iran’s greatness.
It is hard to escape the conclusion that Iran agreed to hold the talks in Baghdad mainly as a way of buying some time in its escalating nuclear standoff. The comment of the day might have been when Larijani said, “We should not expect that this meeting should resolve all the issues in the world or all the disputed matters. It may open up a path, a road, which contains the tension, decreases the tension, and later on may lead to better cooperation. We should be patient, yes.” And, yes, perhaps not expect much very soon.
Here’s the key parts of the WEF exchange:
Question: Is it in Iran’s national interests to cooperate with the U.S. in Iraq? Wouldn’t you rather see the U.S. bogged down in Iraq, to fail and fail badly?
Larijani: You mentioned what the neighbors of Iraq should do. I would count the United States as a neighbor by that definition, because there are plenty of things they should do as well. As far as our national interest is concerned: number one, our national interest is there should be a unified Iraq, a sovereign Iraq, there should be a stable Iraq. An Iraqi government which is stable, which is in control, which is developing, is in the best interests of Iran. We are ready to help any government in Iraq for achieving that. We need a government that can live with others in peace and tranquility. We have plenty of cultural interests, economic interests. So this is basically our interest.
As far as American policy toward Iraq is concerned, there should be a good analysis of that. Perhaps President Bush was expecting that when bombing Iraq, then there would be a red carpet for him. Iraq should submit to the occupation. This was wrong. Iraq is an advanced society, culturally very complex, and nobody likes occupation. This is true. So, there were plenty of mistakes committed by the United States in this occupation.
What we do not want to see is that Iraq should be a place that even the troubles of the United States should be cured there. American policy is wrong in a lot of aspects. Why the Iraqi people should pay for that? Americans are bogged down in Iraq and to some extent in Afghanistan due to a lack of knowledge and bad policy in the area.
Our national interest vis a vis the Americans is very simple. We should contain the tension between us. It is in the benefit of us and the United States. We should decrease the tension. American policy toward Iran is suffering from three decades of paranoia after the revolution. So changing the regime in Iran, bombing Iran, hitting Iran: the language of threat is very common in the literature of American policymakers, politicians and also to some degree among Israelis as well. This is very bad. This is indicative of a wrong mindset. It is not in the interests of America as well.
We think that curbing the tension between us has mutual benefit. This is the rationale for sitting down with the Americans in Iraq to discuss the issue. Iraq will be the first issue, perhaps. And if it succeeds, it can open up to other discussions which affect the whole region. The whole region is suffering from this hostility between Iran and America. And sometimes it has been blown up and fueled by the American positions and statements, perhaps, in our view, to justify their military presence over there. I think that this region does not have more stomach for violence. This is our general perception.
Let me add one thing. We should not expect that this meeting should resolve all the issues in the world or all the disputed matters. It may open up a path, a road, which contains the tension, decreases the tension, and later on may lead to better cooperation. We should be patient, yes.
Question: Does American being bogged down make Iran happy or help Iran?
Larijani: There is one element which everyone in the world is happy [about]. That is that one single power tries to impose itself unilaterally, to claim omnipotence and tries to resolve everything in the world by resort to military might. I think this is an end to that policy. Israel also experienced that when they confronted Lebanon. It is an end, or the beginning of an end, of the overt use of military power. Although it is unfortunately costing Americans’ lives. This is a bad thing, we are very much against that, and we really don’t like to see people killed over there. But this is something that most countries of the world, they like it-- an end to the military use and military occupation, yes.
Question: What does America want from Iran in terms of cooperation in Iraq?
Hatch: We would like to see Iran more cooperative. We would like to see Iran not sending in ability to make bombs, IEDs and EFPs. We had evidence as we were there, very solid evidence, that Iran has been participating in this. We would like to see Iran recognize the fact that, Iran being primarily Shi’a, that the United States has spent an awful lot of its treasure and given a lot of lives, for the greatest liberation of Shi’a in the history of the planet.
And we know that Iran’s a great country. We have many Iranians in our country. We have an Iranian in my family, who I have great respect for. And we would like to have a better relationship. And it is in the best interests of Iran to do so. If you look at the Iranian economy, by all measures it’s not much better than it was in 1979. Yet it has some of the greatest thinkers, business people and abilities of almost any nation. There must be something wrong that a country with that kind of brilliance and that kind of capacity can not raise it’s economic fortunes better than it has. I suspect part of it is because [of] the current leadership in Iran. And which, to some, is something less than sufficient.
We had evidence as we went to Iraq this time that Iran is participating in destabilizing Iraq. I suspect that part of that is because 80% of the people in Iraq wanted a representative form of government and risked their lives to go and vote for it. And we respect that.
Now the United States has spent around $100 billion a year in Iraq. We were upwards of $700 billion to try and stabilize a country that deserves the stabilization and freedoms that can come from having a representative form of government. We would like Iran to work with us in that regard. But not just Iran, all the countries of the Middle East, because it is in I think the Middle East’s best interests to work together to try and bring stability to the Middle East and not war.
I listened to Mr. Larijani and his criticisms of the United States. I think there is no question that we’ve made some mistakes in this war. But the intentions have been honorable. And the fact of the matter is, [Iraq] had violated more than 12 of the U.N. resolutions. We didn’t just go in there because we thought they had weapons of mass destruction, which every liberal country in the world believed at the time, not just the United States of America, but because they were in violation over and over again of U.N. resolutions. I think the whole Middle East would benefit a great deal if stability could come to Iraq and if we would have more cooperation from their neighbors like Iran and Syria and if Lebanon would be less interfered with by some of the nations there including Iran. So Iran, it would seem to be in their best economic interests if nothing else to start mending their own affairs and not interfering with other nations in the Middle East.
Question: Why has it taken the United States so long to reach out to Iran in pursuit of our mutual interests in Iraq? Is this a political ploy by Bush to show that we are reaching out? Are you optimistic that this is substantive and serious?
Hatch: There has been some reaching out, but it’s been behind the scenes rather than in front of the scenes. I think we need to do more, but I think that Iran needs to do more. And there needs to be better good faith shown. Thus far, there’s a real reticence in our country and a lack of respect for the good faith of the Iranian people. But I think America is willing to sit down, negotiate, and see what can be done to resolve these problems.
After all, we don’t enjoy having our young men and women killed in any land. So you can imagine how we feel about this. This is a different war than any other war we’ve ever fought, too, because it’s against terrorism. People who don’t represent a country, they don’t wear uniforms. They don’t abide by international law. And they are people who want to disrupt the basic stabilized forces and countries in our world. And we cannot allow them to win. It’s just that simple. And if we do, I think the whole Middle East I going to be in chaos, as well as many other countries in the world.
So, we would like to have more help. We would like to work with our Iranian counterparts. We know how brilliant the Iranian people are. We have respect for Iranian people. And i think we can do a better job in diplomacy and getting together and seeing what we can to do to resolve some of these difficulties.
But we need some indications of respect, some indications of willingness, some indications of good faith, and some indications of obedience to the rule of law, international law if you will, from Iran and other nations including Syria, in order to accomplish what really could be a very stabilizing force and stabilizing situation in the Middle East, one of the greatest areas in the world today. We’d like to see that. I think maybe we can learn from our Iranian counterparts. If they’ll sit down, and we will sit down together, and maybe solve some of these problems.
Question: Is Iran playing a game in Iraq with the U.S. In the talks, is Iran willing to discuss only Iraq, or are the talks linked to American cooperation on issues of interest to you like the nuclear file and Palestine?
Larijani: In our meeting, both Iran and the United States have agreed to discuss only the issue of Iraq. It is in the presence of the government of Iraq. We are not going to decide for the Iraqis. The role of Iran and the United States is quite different. The United States is an occupying force over there. We are a neighbor country. We will see what we can do to help Iraq. This is our prime objective. We want to have a neighboring country stable, unified, its territorial integrity as well, so we are going to contribute on that. Let me tell you on the record that since the start of the new government in Iraq, Iran’s support for this government was unequaled to any support in the region.
My brother the foreign minister of Jordan was criticizing that some people are left [out of] the constitution of Iraq. The constitution of Iraq is a result of their own production. Perhaps in the future they should amend that. But we should not forget that this worry about coverage of all minorities is stemming from a democratic sense which we totally agree. But in the same Iraq Saddam Hussein was ruling for 20 years, a single family for all the country, there was not room neither for Sunnis, for Shi’ites, for Kurds. My brothers in Jordan were supporting them all the way. They never asked why Saddam Hussein is not letting others to come in. This kind of criticism may not be very substantial.
The issue is that we should not flare up the rivalry of the Sunni and Shi’ite. Iran is not interfering in the Iraqi affairs. We are discussing that with the government daily. How we can help you. If they say, finish, we don’t want any help from you, that’s fine. I mean, we are there to help our brothers in Iraq, period. We are not an occupier.
Senator Hatch has mentioned about the armaments sent from Iran to Iraq. They don’t need armaments from Iran. I mean, Iraq is full of arms. Borders are open. It could come from everywhere. But don’t forget, those who are killed, who they are? They are mostly from the Shi’ites. Sunnis are killed as well. But why Iran should incite? Even suppose Iran doesn’t have any regard for any humanitarian rules. Suppose that. Why we should kill the Shi’ites? At least we are Shi’ites. For us, a Shi’ite, a Sunni, a Kurd to be killed is wrong. Even an al Qaeda member to be killed as far as they are not fighting is wrong. We should put that away from our mindset.
Senator Hatch mentioned the issue of respect, a kind of prelude to the success of the meeting in Iraq. Well, I mean, respect is a two-way story. We have been labeled the axis of evil and we are threatened every other day that this government should be changed. Congress is approving some budget to bring regime change in Iran. President Bush is saying we are going to bomb Iran. Even just recently, after some rather good gestures from Condeleezza Rice, Mr. Dick Cheney came on the war ship in the Persian Gulf and started to threaten us. Here we are, the military might. He said, well, the level of this meeting should be at the ambassadorial level, not more. Are they good signs for respect? Definitely not.
From day number one after revolution until now, it is 30 years past, every day we are witnessing a barrage of accusations from Washington coming towards Iran. Respect for international law. Where we evaded international law? Compare us with Israel. We are a signatory to NPT. Their cameras are over there. They are monitoring us personally and mechanically every day. What about Israel? Israel neither endorse NPT. Doesn’t let atomic energy agency to come over there. So, what is respect? The United States showed in its actions it doesn’t have any respect itself for abiding by international law. Either we accept one concept, there is a super-state called Israel, which is immune from any mistake, it is a God-given state, everything they should do is right. And the rest should abide by the law. These double standards are very wrong.
Question: Would Senator Hatch like to respond?
Hatch: We have a great deal of respect for Iran. There is no question you are a unique nation with great abilities. On the other hand, we don’t think you are adding one jot or tittle to helping to stabilize peace in the Middle East. As a matter of fact, it’s easy to cause destabilization. It’s very difficult to try and work for stabilization.
Now our country needs to do a better job, it seems to me, of dealing with our friends in Iran. I’d like to see that, personally. There is no excuse for us not sitting down and discussing these matters. On the other hand, it makes it very difficult when we know that Iran is helping to send weapons into Iraq that are killing not just Americans but Iraqis themselves and teaching people how to do the EFPs and the IEDs. These are things that bother us greatly. Why any top political scientist would even suggest that the president has indicated that he might bomb Iran or that we are going to invade Iran knowing that he has said exactly the opposite and so has Vice President Cheney, is beyond me.
But to make a long story short, we have respect for Iran. I’d like that respect to be justified. I would like us to sit down and see if we can resolve some of these difficulties. If we could resolve some of these difficulties, we then could probably all turn our attention to the Israel-Palestinian set of problems and maybe for a change bring about some resolution there and some reconciliation.
But it’s very difficult to do that when we find our young boys and girls being killed in Iraq with weapons that have been sent from Iran and weapons of destabilization rather than working together to try and resolve some form of stability here in the Middle East, especially with this new nation called Iraq.
--By Scott MacLeod/Cairo
May 27, 2007 11:57
The Second Coming of Bashar
Soldiers at the normally dour border crossing between Lebanon and Syria were dabka circle dancing and passing out candy. The streets of the Syrian capital were lined with tents stocked with tea and shawarma sandwiches. Billboards Proclaimed: We Believe in Freedom, We Believe in History, We Believe in You. Syrian state television blared old fashioned anthems of praise: "With unlimited love, people are waiting for their promised hero."
Having worked itself up into millennial fervor, Syria voted today in a national referendum on whether or not President Bashar Al Assad should have a second seven year term as the unchallenged leader of this country. With the outcome of the referendum certain, the day was less of a popularity contest then a massive holiday in this security state's true religion: the cult of personality.
Syrian is awash in Bashar posters of all shapes and sizes: Bashar the military man, Bashar the technocrat, Bashar the family man. Bashar covered T-shirts. Bashar covered cars. Bashar covered buildings. When the 41 year-old leader first came to power, he and his modern, Westernized wife were said to be uncomfortable with the Noble Leader-style adulation that surrounded his late father, Hafez Al Assad, the founder of the dynasty. Apparently the second generation is embarrassed no more.
For all the effort put into this referendum, you might actually think that something was at stake. But the only suspense is what the grandiose margin of victory will be. Last time in 2000, Bashar won by a whopping 97.3 percent. So will Bashar better his personal best? One hundred percent is a little too cute even for Syria. I'm betting on 99.9.
Needless to say, electoral oversight is overlooked in Syria. Anyone with any form of ID -- not necessarily even Syrian -- could vote early and often at any and every polling place. One eager young election worker obliged my curiosity by voting with her bloody fingerprint -- a common practice among the true believers or the unlettered -- for at least the second time that day. Though it may be shocking -- shocking, you say -- to think that a Middle East strongman might feel free to interpret the popular will so broadly, it's best to think of today's election not as, well, an election, but rather as a public performance, a display of the the regime's bravado and defiance.
Accused by the United States of supporting terrorism in Iraq, Israel, and Lebanon, Assad's regime has so far fought off the Bush Administrations attempt to isolate it. But the stakes are about to get higher. At the urging of the US and France, the UN Security Council will probably soon set up a tribunal to try suspects in the 2005 assassination of Lebanon former prime minister Rafik Hariri. Such a tribunal could have the power to force defendants and witness to appear in court. So far UN investigators have focused on leading members of the Assad regime.
Once the results of today's referendum are announced, Bashar will probably behave like a king of old, declaring a week-long holiday, issuing pardons, reshuffling his ministers. And when that's done, Syria will be as ready as it ever will-- for war, for peace, for judgment.
--Andrew Lee Butters/Damascus
May 27, 2007 12:39
Bashar's Second-Term: Now For the Hard Part
When Hafez al-Assad died in 2000, few could predict how the country would fare in the hands of his son and political heir, Bashar. Much of the conventional wisdom felt that young “Dr. Bashar” was simply too inexperienced to overcome the Machiavellian back stabbing of the Baath Party regime’s entrenched Old Guard. Others thought that as a member of a modern, younger generation, Bashar would open the country to political and economic freedoms unheard of in the reigns of Syrian dictators stretching back to independence. Neither outlook has turned out to be true. The conventional wisdom now is that Bashar is every bit the strongman his father was.
The old Lion of Damascus
In the last seven years, Bashar has gradually cleared out the entire Old Guard and replaced it with loyalists of his own, putting crucial instruments of power, as his father once did, in the hands of a few close relatives. Despite a youthful flirtation with democracy in his first year in office, Bashar has also steadily cracked down on all opposition and expressions of dissent. Recently, his regime has imprisoned a Who’s Who of Syrian democrats—Anwar al-Bunni, Kamal Labwani, Michel Kilo, Mahmoud Issa, Suleiman Shummar and Khalil Hussein.
Such is the poor state of democratization in Syria that on Sunday the regime is holding not a multiparty presidential election but a yes-no referendum of the sort that effectively had made Hafez President-For-Life. Sunday’s referendum, the last of its kind in the Arab world—Saddam Hussein held them in Iraq before he was toppled; Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak switched to a multiparty ballot two years ago—assures Bashar another seven-year term of office.
The old CW had merit. As a younger man, Bashar clearly signaled his lack of interest in the family business when he went off to London to become an ophthalmologist. During his stay abroad he met his future wife Asma, a striking British-born Syrian woman who had worked as a banker for J.P. Morgan in New York. Bashar was only summoned back to Syria and into politics when his brother Basil, Hafez’s hand-picked successor, suddenly died in a car crash in 1994. At the time of Hafez’s death, Bashar was several years short of the minimum age to be president, so the parliament had to quickly change the constitution to make him eligible.
If Bashar has been able to match his father’s iron grip on power in Damascus, he has proved to be less adept in advancing the Syrian regime’s international and regional interests. He abandoned his father’s trademark approach of carefully balancing friends and enemies in such a way that Syria was simultaneously welcomed as a potential partner and feared as a prospective spoiler. Under Hafez, Syria successfully helped foil Israel’s ambitions in Lebanon but Damascus also entered protracted peace negotiations with the Jewish state (and also allied itself with Washington against Iraq in Desert Storm).
Instead, Bashar threw his lot in with the region’s radical forces, solidifying his father’s wary relationship with Iran and championing the causes of the Lebanese Shi’ite Muslim group Hizballah and the Palestinian Hamas faction. Bashar’s regime has also facilitated the Iraq insurgency against the Iraqi government and U.S. forces by giving safe passage to Iraqi Baathists and Arab jihadists. In response, the Bush administration has sought to isolate Damascus, with some success. Key Arab governments have largely ostracized Bashar, especially after a speech last summer in which he indirectly referred to the rulers of Saudi Arabia and Egypt as “half-men” for declining to back Hizballah in the Lebanon war with Israel.
Bashar’s biggest blunder has been in Lebanon, where the assassination of former Prime Minister Rafic Hariri in 2005 triggered a mass uprising against the Assad Dynasty’s three-decade control of the country and forced the ignominious withdrawal of Syrian troops. Although Bashar strongly denies Syrian involvement in Hariri’s killing, a U.N. investigation has implicated his brother and brother-in-law in the plot and cited reports that Bashar himself personally threatened Hariri before the assassination. Suspicion of Syrian involvement in the killing of Hariri as well as many other anti-Syrian Lebanese figures has plunged the regime into further isolation. Although Secretary of State Condeleezza Rice met her Syrian counterpart in May to discuss efforts to stabilize Iraq, the U.S. continues to downgrade relations with Syria and refuses to return the American ambassador to Damascus. Syria’s isolation may deepen further this week if the U.N. approves an international tribunal to prosecute Hariri’s suspected assassins. Although again Syria denies a connection, the Lebanese government is accusing the Assad regime of sponsoring the militant Fatah al-Islam action at the center of the current turmoil in Lebanon.
Although Bashar appears firmly in control in Syria, his growing international troubles have exposed serious internal fissures. In late 2005, Abdul Halim Khaddam, a retired Syrian vice president, leading Sunni politician and one of Hafez’s trusted lieutenants, defected to France and accused Bashar’s regime of conspiring against Hariri. Khaddam has formed an alliance with the banned Muslim Brotherhood, breathing some life into an opposition movement that had been dormant since the early 1980s. The Hariri assassination also appeared to take a toll within the minority Alawaite community from which the Assads hail; Ghazi Kenaan, long Syria’s point man in Lebanon, died in his office shortly after being interviewed by U.N. investigators. Officials said he shot himself, but speculation was rife that the regime eliminated him as a potential damaging witness in the Hariri case and as a potential rival to Bashar.
Syria’s unlikely president has shown himself to be a much bolder, risk-taking leader than many imagined when he took up residence in Damascus’s presidential palace in 2000. But with the Middle East in a widening crisis--after 9/11, the Iraq war, the Palestinian intifadah, internal Syrian opposition, the Lebanon problem and the looming international tribunal in the Hariri assassination--Bashar’s second term will be the crucial test. It will determine if he is really up to being Syria’s president, or whether he and his countrymen would have been better off had he had stuck with ophthalmology.
--By Scott MacLeod/Cairo
May 26, 2007 8:09
Seymour Hersh and the Lebanon Crisis
Further on the mystery behind Fatah al-Islam, the group at the center of this week's crisis in Lebanon: Michael Young, opinion editor of the Daily Star in Beirut, has taken on U.S. journalist Seymour Hersh over Hersh's recent reporting on the group.
In a piece in the New Yorker magazine issue of Mar. 3, 2007, Hersh suggested that the Sunni-led government of Prime Minister Fouad Siniora may be behind weapons and money being channeled to Fatal al-Islam. Hersh's suggestion was part of an article describing a "redirection" of U.S. policy aimed at undermining Iran and its Shiite allies like Hizballah, a by-product of which, Hersh said, was the "bolstering of Sunni extremist groups that espouse a militant vision of Islam and are hostile to America and sympathetic to Al Qaeda."
The Lebanese government and various Lebanese analysts are accusing Syria of sponsoring Fatah al-Islam to sow turmoil in Lebanon. Hersh's article is one of the only reference sources arguing instead that the Lebanese government may be supporting the group. Pro-government Syrian commentators and even Hizballah's media outlets are holding up Hersh's article as proof that Syria is not behind Fatah al-Islam.
I'll paste the relevant excerpt from Hersh's article below, but here's what Young has to say about "how easy it was" for pro-Syrian Lebanese operators "to manipulate" the award-winning reporter:
Young presents a case that Syrian President Bashar Assad's regime has given Fatah al-Islam logistical assistance and may be collaborating with it to achieve several aims; to send a message that a U.N. tribunal that may prosecute Syrian officials for the Rafic Hariri assassination "will mean a Lebanon in flames"; to ensure it has a decisive say in the election of a new Lebanese president later in 2007; to impose indirect hegemony over Lebanon through a network of allies and agents.
Young says that Hersh's "only evidence" for his suggestion that Lebanese government interests were beind Fatah al-Islam was a quote attributed to Alastair Crooke, a former MI6 agent, who told Hersh he "was told" that weapons and money were offered "by people presenting themselves as representatives of the Lebanese government’s interests--presumably to take on Hezbollah." (In fairness, Hersh also cites American, European and Arab officials telling him about the Siniora government allowing aid to end up with Sunni radical groups--but Crooke is the only one Hersh identified by name; Hersh also cites an International Crisis Group report that says Hariri's son and heir Saad Hariri paid bail money and won amnesty for many members of an Islamic group involved in clashes seven years ago.)
To explain what Young says really happened this time, and why Hersh's story has wrongly gained credence, Young reports that the sister of Rafic Hariri paid off some Sunni fundamentalists to get them out of the southern Lebanese city of Sidon, the Hariri political stronghold. Members of the group, Jund al-Sham, then left Sidon for the Nahr al-Bared refugee camp near Tripoli in northern Lebanon and signed up with Fatah al-Islam. "Now the Hariris look like they financed Islamists, when they were really only doing what they usually do when facing a problem: trying to buy it away," Young says.
Here's what Hersh's article reported:
American, European, and Arab officials I spoke to told me that the Siniora government and its allies had allowed some aid to end up in the hands of emerging Sunni radical groups in northern Lebanon, the Bekaa Valley, and around Palestinian refugee camps in the south. These groups, though small, are seen as a buffer to Hezbollah; at the same time, their ideological ties are with Al Qaeda.
During a conversation with me, the former Saudi diplomat accused Nasrallah of attempting "to hijack the state," but he also objected to the Lebanese and Saudi sponsorship of Sunni jihadists in Lebanon. "Salafis are sick and hateful, and I’m very much against the idea of flirting with them," he said. "They hate the Shiites, but they hate Americans more. If you try to outsmart them, they will outsmart us. It will be ugly."
Alastair Crooke, who spent nearly thirty years in MI6, the British intelligence service, and now works for Conflicts Forum, a think tank in Beirut, told me, "The Lebanese government is opening space for these people to come in. It could be very dangerous." Crooke said that one Sunni extremist group, Fatah al-Islam, had splintered from its pro-Syrian parent group, Fatah al-Intifada, in the Nahr al-Bared refugee camp, in northern Lebanon. Its membership at the time was less than two hundred. "I was told that within twenty-four hours they were being offered weapons and money by people presenting themselves as representatives of the Lebanese government’s interests—presumably to take on Hezbollah," Crooke said.
The largest of the groups, Asbat al-Ansar, is situated in the Ain al-Hilweh Palestinian refugee camp. Asbat al-Ansar has received arms and supplies from Lebanese internal-security forces and militias associated with the Siniora government.
In 2005, according to a report by the U.S.-based International Crisis Group, Saad Hariri, the Sunni majority leader of the Lebanese parliament and the son of the slain former Prime Minister—Saad inherited more than four billion dollars after his father’s assassination—paid forty-eight thousand dollars in bail for four members of an Islamic militant group from Dinniyeh. The men had been arrested while trying to establish an Islamic mini-state in northern Lebanon. The Crisis Group noted that many of the militants “had trained in al-Qaeda camps in Afghanistan."
According to the Crisis Group report, Saad Hariri later used his parliamentary majority to obtain amnesty for twenty-two of the Dinniyeh Islamists, as well as for seven militants suspected of plotting to bomb the Italian and Ukrainian embassies in Beirut, the previous year. (He also arranged a pardon for Samir Geagea, a Maronite Christian militia leader, who had been convicted of four political murders, including the assassination, in 1987, of Prime Minister Rashid Karami.) Hariri described his actions to reporters as humanitarian.
In an interview in Beirut, a senior official in the Siniora government acknowledged that there were Sunni jihadists operating inside Lebanon. "We have a liberal attitude that allows Al Qaeda types to have a presence here," he said. He related this to concerns that Iran or Syria might decide to turn Lebanon into a “theatre of conflict."
The official said that his government was in a no-win situation. Without a political settlement with Hezbollah, he said, Lebanon could “slide into a conflict," in which Hezbollah fought openly with Sunni forces, with potentially horrific consequences. But if Hezbollah agreed to a settlement yet still maintained a separate army, allied with Iran and Syria, "Lebanon could become a target. In both cases, we become a target."
An important element to the story that neither Hersh nor Young got into is the shadowy history of Fatal al-Islam's links with Syria. The group's leader, Shaker al-Ansi, was part of a group called Fatah al-Intifadeh, which was created and backed by the Syrian regime in 1983 as a rebellion against Yasser Arafat's Fatah group, the largest in the PLO. It is common knowledge in the Middle East that for all of its 24 years in existence, Fatah al-Intifadeh has worked only as a Syrian proxy and not as a genuine Palestinian faction. It seems improbable, though not impossible, that al-Absi might have engineered a genuine rebellion against his former Syrian handlers. Or that Siniora's officials and the Hariri family, which strongly believe that Syria is behind Hariri's assassination, would have knowingly got mixed up with a faction that could reasonably be suspected of being a Syrian plant in Lebanon.
--By Scott MacLeod/Cairo
May 25, 2007 12:28
Explaining the Lebanese Jihadi Crisis
Are you having trouble understanding what's going on in Lebanon? Last summer there was war with Israel, all winter and spring the country has been in a political crisis between the government and Hizballah, and now all of a sudden there is some mystery jihadi group staging an uprising in a Palestinian camp. What gives? What does it mean?
Well, if it makes you feel any better, most of us who are covering this incident are confused too. That's in part because the battle for Nahr al-Bared conflates at least four different Middle Eastern conflicts. Perhaps it will help if I lay them out.
The Israeli-Palestinian conflict: Lebanon has some 400,000 Palestinian refugees that originally came in two waves -- 1948 and 1967. That was a long time ago though, and the younger generations have never seen their home country, and still don't have citizenship in this one. Most of the residents of Nahr al-Bared hail from Nazareth in the Galilee.
The Lebanese-Palestinian conflict: The Palestinians brought a lot of trouble with them to Lebanon. Since most of them are Sunni Muslim, their arrival upset this country's fragile sectarian balance, pushing Lebanon towards the civil war that raged from 1975 to 1990. Nor did it help that the PLO turned Lebanon into a base for terror operations against Israel, which led Israel to invade in 1982 (they finally left Southern Lebanon in 2000).
One of the legacies of that period is that Palestinian camps have remained outside the reach of the Lebanese government. As part of an agreement with the Arab League, the Palestinians take care of their own security in order to protect themselves from massacres like the ones in Sabra and Chatila, when Lebanese militiamen murdered Palestinian civilians. An unfortunate side effect of Palestinian self-policing is that armed Palestinian parties are often used as proxy pawns by foreign governments, and the camps are open to infiltration by radical foreign groups. Enter Fatah Al Islam.
Syria (and Iran) vs America: Syria (and its close ally Iran) are in a struggle with America for supremacy in the Middle East, and Lebanon is one of the main battle grounds. Syria wants to regain control of Lebanon which it lost in 2005, after the car bomb killing of former Prime Minister Rafik Hariri galvanized international opinion against the Syrian occupation of Lebanon.
The American-supported Lebanese government is accusing Syria of backing Fatah al-Islam. The concern is that the Syrians will create instability in this country and then slowly work their way back into Lebanon in order to "protect" the Lebanese from themselves.
But like so much in these shadow conflicts, the connection between Syria and Fatah al Islam isn't established fact. As Robert Baer points out in a TIME column, there's no love lost between the secular Syrian regime and Sunni radicals like Fatah Al Islam. And Seymour Hersh, the New Yorker journalist who exposed torture at Abu Ghraib, is going around saying the the US and its allies in Saudi Arabia and the Lebanese government supported the Sunni radicals in Fatah al Islam as a counterweight to Hizballah -- the Syrian suppported Lebanese Shi'ite militia and political party that is trying to topple the Lebanese government.
Al Qaeda jihad: Though the head of Fatah Al Islam is Palestinian, its fighters hail from all over the seething Arab world. They are united by their radical resistance to Western infidels and their Middle Eastern allies like the Lebanese government. The link to Al Qaeda too is murky, but Fatah Al Islam is one of the many groups springing up around the Middle East for whom Osama bin Laden is more of an inspiration than a leader.
So why have all these conflicts suddenly merged? And why now? One explanation is that the conflict between America and Syria over Lebanon is coming to head. The UN Security Council may soon vote on a resolution sponsored by the US to set up a tribunal to try suspects in the Hariri case. (The UN investigation implicated top Syrian officials.)
But another deeper explanation is that the war in Iraq is transforming the region, and linking up all kinds of local problems into meta-conflicts. Not only has the American catastrophe in Iraq emboldened Syria and Iran to challenge American power in Lebanon, but it is opening up pockets of chaos like the one in Nahr al-Bared. Whether or not they are supported by the Syrians or a sort-sighted Dick Cheney conspiracy, Fatah Al Islam is part of the Iraq phenomenon. Many of its fighters supposedly are veterans of that conflict.
Meta-conflicts become harder to solve than local problems. Thus the Lebanese army is wary of storming Nahr al-Bared not just because it has taken a beating from the jihadis already, but because doing so might open up old wounds with the Palestinains, especially if there are more civilian casualties. And though the Lebanese army will surely win this particualr fight, will it end up like the American army in Iraq, playing Wack A-Mole as it pacifies one camp only to see new struggles emerge in others? There are certainly no shortage of foreign fighters learning jihad in Iraq who might enjoy a Mediterranean vaction in Lebanon. If that's the case, the battle for Nahr al-Bared could be a dress rehearsal for bigger battles to come.
--Andrew Lee Butters/Beirut
May 25, 2007 2:10
Finger-pointing at Syria
Prime Minister Fouad Siniora and Druze leader Walid Jumblatt, two key leaders of the March 14 movement in Lebanon, have been speaking about the Lebanese army's fight with the Fatah al-Islam group near Tripoli. Siniora was careful not to accuse Syria of stoking the crisis, but seemed to have President Bashar's regime in mind when he said, in an evident reference to the 2005 assassination of former Prime Minister Rafic Hariri, for which a U.N. report has implicated Syria, "We will not be scared by the bombings just as we were not terrorized by the acts of assassination." Jumblatt was typically outspoken in pointing the finger at Damascus. He called Fatah al-Islam "a terrorist gang that was exported to us from Syria." Neither man spelled it out this time, but the March 14 generally blames Syria for Hariri's assassination and believes Syria is provoking strife in Lebanon to scuttle a U.N. tribunal into the affair.
Here's a bit of Siniora's address to the nation on live television Thursday, ostensibly commemorating the seventh anniversary of Israel's withdrawal from southern Lebanon but meant as a statement on the current crisis:
Over the past days, I heard much talk, unjust incitement, and tendentious mobilization aimed at saying that the Lebanese state, the Lebanese Army, or the Lebanese Government are targeting the Palestinian refugees in Lebanon or the Palestinian people. The truth, the absolute truth is that the Lebanese Army is the victim of a criminal aggression carried out by a terrorist organization claiming to embrace Islam and the protection of Palestine.
We should be clear in making a distinction between a terrorist organization, which tried to capitalize on the suffering and struggle of the Palestinian people, and our brothers in the camps. For us, the distinction is clear and obvious. We will work to eradicate and strike at terrorism. As for our brothers in the camps, we will work as we have worked and even more to embrace and protect them. There will be no targeting, sedition, or division between the Lebanese and the Palestinians.
We will not surrender to the terrorism of gunmen and we will not surrender to the terrorism of terrorists under any slogan they might hide. We will not be scared by the bombings just as we were not terrorized by the acts of assassination. Our only message today and tomorrow is the civil state, national security, the national and pan-Arab responsibility, and the Lebanese people's life and future, and ending these terrorist and criminal phenomena without hesitation and as soon as possible.
Here's part of the strong stuff Jumblatt had to say at a press conference earlier this week:
The Nahr al-Barid Palestinian refugee camp today is a captive to the Fatah al-Islam organization, which is a terrorist gang that was exported to us from Syria. Shaker al-Absi, the wanted man who was sentenced to death in Jordan in 2002 after he was convicted in connection with the killing of a US diplomat in Jordan, and who was imprisoned in Syria, was later released and exported to Lebanon, along with others, such as Shihab al-Qaddur. Of course, he went around in Nahr al-Barid Palestinian refugee camp as well as in other places that I would not describe as refugee camps because these were purely Syrian centers, the centers of Ahmad Jibril and others.
A terrorist gang has taken Nahr al-Barid Camp as a hostage, and a way had to be found to free the people of Nahr al-Barid but there is also a need to wipe out this gang. This can be done by cooperation between the Palestinian organizations, the Lebanese Army, and the Lebanese state.
Everything that is happening today regrettably reminds us of what Bashar Assad told Rafic Hariri during their famous meeting on 28 August 2004. He told him: Renew Lahhud's presidential term and if you refuse I will destroy and devastate Lebanon. When we see what is happening, we must go back to these words, which Bashar Assad said to martyr prime minister Rafic Hariri. The series of bombings and terror began from that moment.When they failed in all their endeavors, they unleashed direct and open terrorism against us under the name of Fatah al-Islam.
They are doing, or are trying to do, in Lebanon what they did in Iraq. All those who blow themselves up in Iraq--80 percent of those who blow themselves up among civilian Shiites, Sunnis, Kurds, Christians, and others arrive from Damascus. Today, and having failed in his plot in Iraq, he is transferring these bombers, transporting them to Lebanon.
For its part, Syrian officials have refrained from much comment and the state media has broadly supported the Lebanese army's stand against Fatah al-Islam. Waddah Abed Rabbo, editor of Syria's first private newspaper, scoffed at the accusations made by the March 14 camp. He cites a report by American journalist Seymour Hersh suggesting that Siniora's government was financing Fatah al-Islam, a radical Sunni Islamist faction, as a counterweight to Hizballah, a Shiite group. The Syrian press seemed more preoccupied by Sunday's referendum on giving Assad another seven-year term of office.
Hizballah, Syria's most important ally in Lebanon, has kept a low profile on the Tripoli clashes. The group has come under increasing criticism itself for triggering Israel's massive onslaught against Lebanon last summer and for trying to topple the Siniora government through street protests afterwards. After some palpable hesitation in making a statement, Hizballah expressed strong support for the Lebanese army. It insinuated, although with a notable lack of vigor, that Siniora's government as well as the U.S., rather than Syria, was behind Fatah al-Islam.
--By Scott MacLeod/Cairo
May 24, 2007 10:57
What do you call refugees who are forced to flee their refugee camp?
Internally Displaced Persons (IDP's) is the term of art used by NGOs to describe people fleeing violence who remain within the borders of their own country. But that term doesn't work for the Palestinians who have fled Nahr al-Bared refugee camp outside Tripoli in northern Lebanon to escape the violent standoff between Al-Qaeda inspired militants and the Lebanese army. They stopped being internally displaced when they left Palestine in 1948 and became refugees from the violence that preceded the creation of Israel. Almost 60 years later, they are still foreigners in Lebanon, since this country refuses to give them citizenship.
So are they externally displaced persons? Are they displaced refugees? Or are they just dammed?
--Andrew Lee Butters/Tripoli
May 24, 2007 1:49
What Muslim Americans Think
The Pew Research Center has released an important survey, Muslim Americans: Middle Class and Mostly Mainstream. It is an excellent review of a minority group that helps debunk the stereotypes that became more pronounced after 9/11. In some areas, the attitudes of Muslim Americans are contrasted with those of Muslims living in Europe.
Some of the findings:
POPULATION: The survey estimates that there are 2.35 million Muslims in the U.S., less than 1% of the population, half what some Muslim activists cite.
PROFILE: 65% of Muslim Americans were born outside the U.S.; nearly 40% immigrated since 1990. Of the 35% who were born in the U.S., most are converts to Islam. Arabs represent the largest percentage of foreign-born Muslim Americans, 37%.
EDUCATION AND INCOME: 47% have attended college. Muslim Americans matched the average U.S. incomes, with 16% earning more than $100,000 a year, and 41% earning more than $50,000. By comparison, Muslims in Western European countries were likely to earn much less than the average.
IDENTITY: 47% think of themselves as Muslims first, compared to 81% of British Muslims and 69% of Spanish. The U.S. rate was comparable to France, where 46% think of themselves as Muslims before being French.
BEING A MUSLIM AMERICAN: 53% say it has become more difficult to be a Muslim in the U.S. since Sept. 11. 54% believe Muslims are singled out for government surveillance. 15% say they have been called an offensive name, though 73% say they have never been victims of discrimination.
VIEWS ON U.S. FOREIGN POLICY: 12% say the Iraq war was the right decision; 75% say it was wrong. 35% say the Afghan war was right; 48% wrong. 26% say the war on terrorism is sincere; 55% not sincere.
VIEWS ON ISRAEL/PALESTINE: 61% say a way can be found for Israelis and Palestinians to coexist. (The optimism matches the views of people in the U.S. and Israel, where 67% agreed. Only 17% of people in the Palestinian territories share the optimism.)
VIEWS ON ISLAMIC EXTREMISM: 58% say their opinion of Al Qaeda is very unfavorable; compared to 5% favorable and 10% somewhat unfavorable. 83% say suicide bombing can never/rarely be justified; 8% often/sometimes. Young American Muslims were slightly more likely to view Al Qaeda and suicide bombings favorably.
VIEWS ON AMERICAN POLITICS: 14% of voters voted for Bush; 71% for Kerry. 11% are Republican or leaning that way; 63% Democrat.
RELIGIOUS PRACTICE: 61% say they pray every day (Pew says 70% of U.S. Christians pray daily.) 41% say they perform all five prayers per day in accordance with one of the five pillars of Islam. 63% say there is no conflict in being a devout Muslim and living in a modern society.
VIEWS ON LIFE: 78% say they are very or pretty happy with their lives. 71% say hard work leads to success. 43% say Muslims should adopt American customs while 26% say they should remain distinct from American society. 62% sat it is OK to marry a non-Muslim. 61% say homosexuality should be discouraged; 27% say accepted.
--By Scott MacLeod/Cairo
May 23, 2007 10:24
Bad Idea at the Battle for Nahr al-Bared
This is what happens fours days into covering a seige. Your colleagues decide that the safest place to take cover -- and have a smoke -- is a gas station.
--Andrew Lee Butters/Tripoli
May 23, 2007 10:35
Another Bad Summer in Lebanon?
Arriving in Lebanon last night, the only foreigners on my flight were television crews and journalists coming to cover the fighting between the Lebanese army and Islamic militants in Tripoli. This bodes badly for the country, just a couple weeks before the all important summer tourism season. After last year's diastourous summer war with Israel, and demonstrations all winter, if the country has another bad summer, then we all need to start worrying about an Argentina-style financial collapse here.
The additional checkpoints on my way home were one measure of just how worried everyone is. Also check out this depressing quote in a Daily Star story about the tourism economy, from someone who is supposed to be promoting the country.
"People are always afraid," said Carine Koleilat, sales and ticketing representative at United Airlines. "You can't really plan anything, so that sucks. If I'm a tourist, I know that I won't come here."
The article suggests that a quick resolution to the crisis might mitigate any long term economic effects. But what I find surprising is how long the clash has gone on already. Fatah Al-Islam has faced down down the Lebanese army for four days now. Arab countries (and possibly the United States) are trying to rush weapons deliveries to the Lebanese government, which only emphasis how much better armed the militants are -- a sure sign that they are receiving state support from soneone.
Off to Tripoli...
--Andrew Lee Butters/Beirut
May 23, 2007 10:22
Update on Haleh Esfandiari
The Washpost's Robin Wright, one of the keenest American observers of Iran, has an excellent piece today on Haleh Esfandiari, who Wright calls a "hostage." Esfandiari, an Iranian-American who heads the prestigious Middle East program at the Woodrow Wilson center in Washington, was detained in Tehran this month and is being investigated for "crimes against national security."
Check out Wright's article, but here's the essence:
Esfandiari is a most unlikely hostage.
A birdlike powerhouse of a woman, weighing in at barely 100 pounds, the 67-year-old academic has quietly run the Middle East program at the Smithsonian's Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars for almost a decade. Few American scholars have done more than Esfandiari, a Shiite Muslim, to advocate "open debate and dialogue" between two countries that have been at odds for almost three decades, according to Wilson Center director and former congressman Lee Hamilton.
"The U.S.-Iranian relationship suffers from more than a quarter-century of no dialogue and no talks. She wanted bridges, not walls. She wanted people to talk, not dictate. She wanted people to listen and learn, not filibuster and spin," says Hamilton, who also co-chaired the Iraq Study Group, which urged the Bush administration to engage with Iran to help stabilize Iraq.
Iran's leading hard-line newspaper, Kayhan, now a mouthpiece for Ahmadinejad's government, alleged last week that Esfandiari was fomenting a "velvet revolution" in Iran and spying for the United States and Israel. Kayhan was, ironically, the place were Esfandiari got her start as a young journalist and met her husband, Shaul Bakhash.
--By Scott MacLeod/Cairo
May 22, 2007 9:33
Bombings in Lebanon
Besides the fighting in Tripoli between the Lebanese Army and a Sunni militant group -- Fatah Al-Islam -- two bombs have exploded in Beirut in the last two days. One of them, which detonated shortly before midnight on Sunday, was planted in Christian East Beirut not far from my apartment. The other exploded yesterday in Muslin West Beirut. Both neighborhoods where the bombs went off are chi-chi strongholds of the country's business and political ruling classes, which back the Lebanese government.
The most logical explanation so far for the bombs is that they are attempts by Fatah Al Islam to distract and intimidate Lebanese security forces from continuing their assault against the group, which is holed up inside a Palestinian refugee camp. This explains the seemingly hurried nature of the first bomb which targeted a shopping mall with heavy security that probably prevented the attackers from putting the device in a place were it could have harmed more people. (One woman was killed.)
Many in the Lebanese government are blaming Syria for backing Fatah Al Islam. They accuse the regime of Syrian President Bashar Al Assad of sowing chaos as a way to prevent the government and the United Nations Security Council pushing for a tribunal to try suspects in the 2005 assassination of former Lebanese prime minister Rafik Hariri. (I've written before about the possibility that the UN tribunal could spark violence.)
But the Syrian government is spinning this the opposite way. The Syrian Ambassador to the UN hinted that anti-Syrian forces in Lebanon might be behind the violence, as a way of galvanizing the Lebanese public, and international opinion against Syria. He noted that in the past there have been attacks at sensitive moments in the UN investigation of Hariri's death (which has implicated Syria) as if designed to embarrass the Syrian government.
This line of argument may have had some traction in the past. I for one have had doubts about Syrian involvement in some of the bombings that have occurred after Hariri's death. (Surely Syrian intelligence isn't totally stupid). But as a draft resolution to establish the Hariri tribunal by force makes the rounds at the UN Security Council, Syria may well be capable of desperate acts.
--Andrew Lee Butters on my way back to Lebanon
May 21, 2007 10:58
Inside Israeli and Palestinian Heads
At the World Economic Forum conference in the Dead Sea, we caught some inside glimpses into Palestinian-Israeli relations and Palestinian-Palestinian tensions.
Bottom line: Israelis are shortsightedly citing Palestinian violence as a reason for hesitating on a final settlement with the Palestinians. But for all of the heartfelt appeals from Palestinian moderates, the Palestinian attacks and internal troubles tragically feed the Israeli logic. The words and body language didn't bode very well for the efforts of Condi Rice to restart serious peace negotiations with Prime Minister Ehud Olmert and President Mahmoud Abbas, whose Fatah party led negotiations leading to the Israel-PLO Oslo accord in 1993.
Palestinians and Israelis hadn't been talking officially since Ariel Sharon's election in 2001, until some recent, apparently unproductive meetings between Abbas and Olmert. So the comments of Israeli Deputy Prime Minister Shimon Peres and Palestinian negotiator Saeb Erakat, though made in front of hundreds of WEF delegates, showed the type of blunt, intimate exchanges that leaders on both sides might be having behind the scenes now.
In a session called "Peace in Pieces: Dealing with Violence," Arab League Secretary General Amre Moussa kicked off by touting the 2002 Arab peace initiative and complaining that Israeli leaders had ignored it while they continued to construct settlements and the separation wall in the West Bank. Moussa complained that Israel and the U.S. responded to the Palestinian national unity government formed in the recent Mecca Agreement by continuing an economic embargo that helped spark the Palestinian-on-Palestinian fighting.
Peres responded by saying that Israelis had withdrawn from Gaza at great political and financial cost only to see the territory fortified as a base of military operations against Israel and experience a "free fall" in violence. Hamas policies and actions, Peres explained, forced Israel to react militarily in a way "that we don't want to do." Peres praised the Arab peace plan as "music we have not heard for 100 years" (though he complained there was still no Arab "orchestra") but that the problem now is not just negotiating a peace deal with Abbas or the Arab League, but countering the threat from Iran, and its allies like Hamas and Hizballah. "Hamas is not looking for a solution," he said. "They are looking for a change in the Middle East. Hizballah, Hamas and Iran have the same line."
Peres's solution is a three-track effort to improve Palestinian daily life while ensuring Israeli security; offering Palestinians a "political horizon" for a final settlement of the dispute; and working to rebuild the Palestinian economy. In the big news of the day, Peres announced that Israel would formally offer a counter-proposal to the Arab peace initiative. Moussa said that a reasonable counter offer would mean "we are all in business." But when Peres was pressed by Moussa on when the Israeli counter proposal would be forthcoming, he drew laughs when he equivocated, "As soon as possible."
Erakat volunteered an admission that Palestinians had embarrassed themselves by the infighting between Abbas's Fatah party and Hamas, and there was an absolute need to reestablish order under one government authority to prevent what he called the "growth of the Mogadishu Syndrome." But he partially blamed the embargo for the infighting, rattling off a list of horrible stats on the abysmal quality of Palestinian life especially in Gaza. "What do you expect?" he asked Peres. "We don't have the resources to restore security." He said the Israelis had effectively tied the hands and feet of Abbas, threw him into the sea, and then complained they didn't have a negotiating partner.
Then Erakat came with what may have been the most useful observation of the day, that "the time for negotiations has finished, now it is the time for decisions." What he means is that after years of negotiations, both sides know what they want and what is realistic to achieve, and now they have to summon the political will to make the difficult compromises. He argued that peace talks would tremendously strengthen both Olmert and Abbas. His prescription was that 1) Palestinians need to re-establish one authority in Palestine; 2) Israelis and the West have to lift the embargo and 3) Israel has to accept the Arab peace plan and start negotiations on that basis.
Peres talked about how far Israel's right wing had come in accepting a 2-state solution, but repeated that the problem was now not negotiating with Abbas but dealing with Hamas and Hizballah. "The problem isn't to reach an agreement but to implement it."
Erakat, replied, "What's holding us back?" To which Peres said that Israel would do little as long as Hamas is firing rockets at Israeli citizens. "To us, security is the first priority."
Erakat: "We are ready, the time is for decisions."
Peres: "The first decision is to introduce security."
Erakat: "This (negotiations) is where the security comes. 'Security' is not 'defense'"
Peres replied that Israel supports the right of Palestinians to independence, security and economic development, but first Israel had to protect the lives of its people.
Erakat: "Let's do it."
At that point, Peres had to excuse himself to keep a scheduled appointment with Jordan's King Abdullah II and get back to an Israeli cabinet meeting in just two hours.
After Peres left the platform, Erakat hammered the same point in response to concerns from two American congressmen about Hamas. When Arafat was alive, the Israelis said he was "not a partner." When Abbas became leader with Arafat's death, he was considered "irrelevant." "Now the Israelis can't negotiate because Hamas is there. They are seeking a pretext to blame it on us. Address the real issue, which is the occupation which has lasted 40 years." Erakat stressed that the Mecca Agreement left negotiations with Israel in the hands of Abbas and not Hamas leaders, so Israel should take up the opportunity to deal with Abbas.
Not helping matters, however, are the mixed signals about Hamas coming out of the Arab states. In an earlier session, speaking in support of the Saudi-sponsored Arab peace initiative, Prince Turki al Faisal called on Palestinians to replace the armed struggle with the Gandhi method of civil resistance. But Moussa told the panel that included Peres that you "can't call on Palestinians to be pacified until Israelis decide to withdraw." As regards the occupation, he added, "people ought to reject it, people have to reject it."
It was interesting to see Erakat take on Hamas at a lunch hosted by Palestinians afterwards. And it was interesting to see Palestinian businessmen and NGO leaders taking on the whole Palestinian political spectrum. Erakat spent alot of time talking about the need for Palestinian reform and democracy.
Erakat mocked Hamas for trying to lead the Palestinian people while rejecting U.N. resolutions and the Arab League peace initiative which support Palestinian aspirations for statehood. Despite the current gloom, he remained insistent that Palestinians were evolving and would eventually attain their goals.
He said this would not come solely by pressure from Palestinians, which he described half-jokingly as the weakest negotiating partner in history, having "no army, no air force, no economy and fighting each other."
No, he said, the Israelis are experiencing "growing pains" and would reach the conclusion that a Palestinian state best served their interests. Erakat joked that "after extensive research" it was determined that Muslims and Christians living in Israel or Israeli-controlled territories were not expected to convert to Judaism. Given the more rapid population growth rate for Arabs, eventually Israel would have to accept a separate Palestinian state to avoid being taken over itself by Palestinians.
Erakat said if the Israelis wanted to have one state from the Jordan River to the Mediterranean Sea, that was fine with him, even if they called it Israel and not Palestine, so long as Arabs received equal rights. "If there is one state, we'll accept it, and then fight for an equal voice," he said. "We'll change the name [of the state] by votes in the Knesset some day."
Erakat ended the lunch with a popular joke in the Middle East.
An Israeli and a Palestinian go to a Western film. As a cowboy races off on a horse, the Israeli bets the Palestinian $20 that the rider will fall off. When the rider proceeds to do just that, the Israeli says, I can't take your money. I saw the film before. The Palestinian says, So did I. But I thought the cowboy would learn from his mistake.
--By Scott MacLeod/Suwaymah