May 8, 2008 11:03

Is This the Start of the Next Lebanese Civil War?

A Shia militant dressed as a police officer fires into a Sunni neighborhood/Photo by Pasqual Gorriz

The barricades have spread. The airport is blocked. Rolling gunfights and sporadic rocket fire have sent the residents of Beirut to the cash machines and grocery stores to prepare for the worst. But the most telling sign that the second day of violent clashes between supporters of Lebanon's American-backed government and the Iranian and Syrian-backed opposition is moving towards civil war came from a speech from Hizballah chief Hassan Nasrallah, the leader of the opposition. Nasrallah said that a recent government decision to shut down Hizballah's private communications network amounted to an act of war.

Hizballah views its communications network as an important weapon in its military struggle against Israel. (See Nick Blanford's story from yesterday "Cell Phone Civil War"). Today, Nasrallah, who in the past has said that Hizballah's weapons are only for use against Israel, ominously declared that his forces would fight an internal battle against the government if it didn't reverse its decisions to shut the mobile phone network and to remove the head of the airport, whom the government suspects of pro-opposition sympathies. Nasrallah accused the government of trying to do Israel's dirty work by disarming Hizaballah, and of trying to turn the airport into a base for the Mossad and CIA.

Just why the government chose this particular moment to move against Hizballah's infrastructure remains unclear. Hizballah, which fought Israel to a stand-still in the summer war of 2006, is much stronger and better organized than government forces, and is certain to win any confrontation. Still, Hizballah would have much to lose in an open civil war. Not only would the chaos distract them from the far more dangerous struggle with Israel, but it could also help radical Al-Qaeda affiliated Sunni jihadi groups infiltrate Lebanon.

So far there is no word yet of casualties from the clashes, which are being fought mainly by rival street gangs in areas of west and central Beirut where Shia and Sunni neighborhoods meet. Because Lebanon's constitution divides power among the country's main religious groups, Lebanon's political stand-off has devolved into a sectarian one, with the main action pitting Muslims against Muslims, mirroring regional tension as a whole.

Which may limit the Lebanese governments ability to back down from a fight it cannot win. The officials who moved against the Hizballah network are known to coordinate their actions with the United States, and the Bush administration may be digging in its heels into Lebanon while its days in office are on the wane.

Photo by Pasqual Gorriz

--Andrew Lee Butters/Beirut

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May 8, 2008 12:32

Gary Sick on Hillary: More of the Same on Iran?

Few Americans watch Iran more closely or with deeper understanding than Gary Sick, a Carter White House advisor who is a professor and executive director of Columbia University's Gulf/2000 Project. What Sick has to say on Hillary Clinton's "obliterate" comment, in a note circulated to Project members, provides insights into future U.S. policy on Iran. This is must reading, following up our recent posts and reader comments:

Hillary Clinton's warning that the United States could "obliterate" Iran if that country should "foolishly consider" launching an attack on Israel is, of course, pandering to a broad American constituency that wants to hear tough rhetoric about Iran. It is also intended to appeal to a constituency that needs constant reassurance that America's relationship with Israel is secure. And, by addressing a strategic hypothetical that would by any measure be many years in the future ("in the next ten years" in her words), it seems intended to convince doubters that a woman is tough enough - perhaps more than tough enough - to be commander in chief.

Although her use of the word "obliterate" was both excessive and ill-advised, it might be seen as a challenge to Obama to match her toughness, or even as simply pandering shamelessly to a constituency that thrives on political red meat. That is not very flattering to her, but it might be regarded as politics as usual. What makes this statement particularly troublesome is that it cannot be dismissed as mere off-the-cuff responses to a TV interviewer. Rather, it appears to be part of a broader, considered policy that would likely be at the heart of the Middle East strategy of President Hillary Clinton.

The Clinton campaign, while explaining her remarks to skeptics, made it clear that this was no slip of the tongue. Glenn Kessler of the Washington Post reports that the "obliterate" remarks are part of a more extensive plan, first advanced in the debate prior to the Pennsylvania primary, for a new defensive alliance with the Arab states and Israel, in which the United States would extend not only a "security umbrella" over Israel but also "provide a deterrent backup" that would extend U.S. nuclear guarantees to Arab states who renounce nuclear weapons. The apparent author of this strategy is Martin Indyk.

Martin Indyk came into Bill Clinton's administration as director for Middle East affairs on the National Security Council and later represented the United States as ambassador to Israel (twice) as well as a stint as Assistant Secretary for Near East Affairs at the Department of State. He was present at every stage of the Clinton administration's Middle East policy, but he is most frequently remembered, at least by Persian Gulf specialists, as the author of the so-called "dual containment" policy.

"Dual containment" basically postulates that the way to deal with recalcitrant states in the Persian Gulf (i.e. states that are unsympathetic to U.S. interests and objectives) is to isolate them and "contain" them, relying on sanctions and superior military power. It was also quite explicit in linking "containment of Iraq and Iran in the east" with "promotion of Arab-Israeli peace in the west." This was a new twist in U.S. policy which had previously maintained that the Persian Gulf/oil could be separated from the Arab-Israeli dispute. The policy was therefore viewed by many as attempting to wall off the troublesome Persian Gulf region so that the United States could focus on the Arab-Israel issue, or, as it later evolved, on Israel alone. It was also a unilateral policy: collaborators would be nice, but in their absence the United States could and would act alone.

Although the name "dual containment" is no longer used, especially after the invasion of Iraq removed one of the policy's targets, it is nevertheless true that the dominant premise of the policy - that you deal with your enemies and rivals unilaterally by isolation and threats rather than engagement - is one Clintonian policy that has been adopted unabashedly by the Bush administration. It has defined U.S. policy in the region for the past decade and a half.

Dual containment was first announced by Indyk in May 1993, in the early months of the Bill Clinton administration. The previous administration of George Bush pere had held out the promise that "Good will begets good will," to entice Iran to intervene on behalf of the American hostages in Lebanon; Iran did so, but by the time the hostages were successfully released, Bush was deep into a presidential campaign and could not fulfill his commitment. Then, of course, he lost the election and the Iranians were told that they would have to forget about any U.S. promises.

Still, Iran had taken a serious decision to try to open channels to the United States, and when Bill Clinton was elected, they put out new feelers (in which I had a small role). These were ignored in favor of dual containment. Iran tried again with unilateral economic offers in 1995, but the Clinton administration responded by enacting far-reaching economic sanctions against Iran.

Dual containment and its accompanying sanctions were adopted with the stated objective of changing Iran's behavior on a number of issues: nuclear, Arab-Israel peace process, and terrorism, among others. After a full quarter of a century, with the United States doing everything in its power to coerce and threaten Iran economically and militarily, Iran's policies have changed to some degree, but it would take a real ideologue to claim that they have evolved on anything other than an Iranian schedule according to Iranian political objectives. In short, U.S. policies have failed utterly in their key objectives. Yet our answer - and the answer of the Clinton campaign from what we can tell - is more of the same. Clinton-Indyk give lip service to engagement, but then so does Bush-Cheney.

The "new defensive alliance" with Arab states of the Middle East that Sen. Clinton has been proposing in the past few weeks is so similar to the anti-Iran alliance that the Bush administration has been trying to sell to the Sunni Arab states (with Israel as a silent partner), that I must admit I cannot see the difference. In fact, the "Bush Doctrine" toward Iran and the Arab states was nothing but a continuation of the "Clinton-Indyk Doctrine" that preceded it, and it now appears that if Hillary should win the presidency, we will come full circle back to Clinton-Indyk redux.

I have known Martin Indyk since we were at Columbia together, and I respect him as a professional. But I thought dual containment was a terrible idea from the first time I heard it, and Martin knows it. By emphasizing threats and sanctions above even the most minimal engagement, I think this concept was the origin of many of our worst mistakes and missed opportunities over the past 15 years.

Characteristically, this latest version never stops to ask how the regional states may react to our unilateral unfolding of an "umbrella," much less our anticipation that they will respond with gratitude and formal recognition of Israel. That is what Indyk specifies as the price. This sounds like the kind of unrealistic expectations that we have built into our Middle East policies repeatedly over the past dozen years.

As my friends know well, I have been a stout defender of Hillary Clinton's campaign from the very beginning, while maintaining my admiration for Barack Obama. (In the most recent case, I was impressed by the fact that Obama refused to rise to the bait, while she accepted the hypothetical and ran with it.) I respected the depth of her politically skilled network, her grit and determination, and her ability to take a punch. My major argument, of course, was Clinton's experience. But experience is a two-edged sword.

The chance for a fresh start - for "change" in the current political lexicon - was to me the great hope of this presidential campaign. But Clinton's recent remarks, and the underlying policy from which they apparently sprang, are evidence that, at least on this issue, we might only look forward to more of the same under a Clinton presidency. In that sense, I think we would be losing one of the great chances of this generation to begin to fashion a more sensible policy in a region that I care about greatly.

--By Scott MacLeod/Dubai

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May 8, 2008 11:51

The Night Watch

Photo by Pasqual Gorriz

Abu Ziad runs an unusually busy -- and unusually well-armed -- aluminum hardware store. In the back office behind the stockroom and workshop, he receives a constant stream of walkie-talkie carrying visitors wearing combat boots and utility vests with bulges at the hip. They aren't here to order screen doors and window frames. Abu Ziad is the security chief for Tariq Jdeideh, one of the largest Sunni neighborhood in West Beirut, and which is surrounded by Shia Muslim areas.

Tariq Jdeideh is Lebanon's new sectarian frontline, and almost every night there is some kind of clash or incident between Abu Ziad's men and their opposite numbers, mostly street youth loosely affiliated with Shia parties such as Amal. Earlier this week, while visiting Abu Ziad, word came in of one incident. An Amal member had allegedly attacked a Tariq Jdeideh resident, and Abu Ziad's men responded by burning the guy's motor-scooter. Not long afterwards, an anonymous caller threatened Abu Ziad: "Don't leave the neighborhood, or we we'll get you and you children."

Abu Ziad didn't seem particularly worried, though he called his eldest son and told him to return home immediately by avoiding alleys and driving only on busy highways. "He's on high security alert all the time, anyway," said Abu Ziad. "Everyone is filling their homes with guns now. War is knocking at the door."

Abu Ziad has some 10,000 men -- all of them volunteers or paid a modest stipend -- under his command, 500 who would be willing to die to protect their homes and families, he said. Closed circuit cameras monitor the entrances to the neighborhood, backed by rooftop spotters who keep track of anyone trying to set up car bombs or otherwise spy. "If someone is pretending to sell vegetables but is not really selling vegetables, we kick him out. No one can come here and put up their flags and posters."

"We used to believe in Lebanon, and we used to believe in the government and the army," said Abu Ziad, between taking security phone calls and doing very little metal business. "But now they want the Sunni sect to vanish. They want us out of our homes, and to put someone else in our homes. So were are taking control of the streets to get our privacy by force."

Night falls on Tariq Jdeideh, but the street lights don't come on. The neighborhood watch, some 20 young men on each street, use the cover of darkness to set up checkpoints, asking each driver to turn off their headlights and give a password, while the occasional housewife in headscarf and nightgown looks down from the balconies at the commotion below. A few men wearing black ski masks and carrying cheap new Chinese-made Kalashnikov assault riffles show up. They say they have military training -- the result of national service -- but are clearly eager amateurs. "We have jobs and careers," said one. "You could meet me on the street tomorrow and not know the difference."

In fact, there doesn't seem to be much difference at all between Tariq Jdeideh and any other neighborhood in West Beirut, certainly not the Shia one just a stone's throw away on the other side of a well-lit highway. Young men who look nearly identical to the young men here patrol streets that look identical to these and return home at dawn to apartment buildings just like these. A call comes over the radio. Someone suspicious is on the highway. He is wearing a striped t-shirt. There is much excitement and motor-scootering.

The dark dream of Tariq Jdeideh ends abruptly with just a five minute drive. Downtown Beirut is in the midst of its after-hours ritual of dining and clubbing. But which is the dangerous fantasy: the street patrols that go on night after night, or the procession of luxury cars and women in short skirts?

--Andrew Lee Butters/Beirut

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